Turkish television as soft power

sude almus

Turkish television shows, often referred to as “dramas” or “series,” have gained immense popularity since the 2000s. In the last decade, “Turkish TV series have become a main player in the international TV industry as 25 percent of imported fiction content on a global scale derives from Turkey […] Furthermore, reports rank Turkey as the second-highest exporter of TV series following the United States, selling to more than 140 countries, alongside a business volume assessed to surpass $350 million as of 2017.” The exported series present “a strong mix of slick production, storylines full of passion as well as intrigue, beautiful actors/actresses and iconic Turkish sites.” Through their growing popularity and marketability, Turkish series have become tools of Turkish foreign policy. Through an analysis of recent history and select case studies, this paper examines the popularity of Turkish television series as a form of soft power; television shows became tools for the dissemination of state propaganda in the 21st century with the ultimate aim of establishing neo-Ottoman hegemony over the regions surrounding Turkey -- the Balkans, the Middle East, and other “Muslim lands” with cultural proximity. 

The increase in popularity and viewership is a global phenomenon, augmented by the digital age in which television programs are disseminated online and “television audiencehood is re-constructed via fan websites, Facebook pages and so on, or is taken as a medium through which the viewing activity itself occurs.” However, the locus of this growth in interest can be restricted to the following regions: the Balkans, the Middle East or “Arab World”, and to some extent Central and South Asia. It is in this region in which Turkish dramas have entered the mainstream. Television series are broadcast on mainstream channels, online fan bases are large and active, and particularly in the Middle East, “Turkish stars [are] given the red carpet treatment” and “actors having joined ambassadors at receptions held at consulates.” 

It is particularly interesting to note these regions’ geographical and cultural proximity to Turkey, the legacies of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and Middle East, and the rise of pan-Turkic nationalism in post-Soviet Central Asia. In the realm of contemporary Turkish foreign policy, these regions pose benefits and challenges. In the Balkans, Turkish influence depends on acceptance or rejection of “the Ottoman Empire as a superordinate identity” and varies wildly across ethnic and religious groups. Turkey wields considerable amount of hard power; “a country’s military, economy, geography, and population and the way these factors can be utilized to achieve a state’s strategic goals.” However, through exported television series and pop culture, Turkish series have emerged as a prominent example of soft power. Soft power “comprises of the skill to structure a situation in such way that others will desire what you want, that is, develop preferences or define their interests in ways that are in accordance to those of your own nation.” The popularity of Turkish dramas has led directly to the popularity of Turkey itself and the rise of Turkey as “a point of cultural orientation.” The “soft power” through brand appeal of Turkey and Turkish culture has impact across multiple dimensions such as the realm of politics and foreign policy, Turkish economy, and tourism. In the realm of tourism, for example, the Cultural Ministry “directly connect[ed] the dramas to the recent upsurge in the amount of tourists to Turkey from Arab countries” and the tourism industry has shifted its orientation to serve the expectations of these fans of Turkish exports. 

This paper aims to explore the political dimensions of television programs as a form of soft power. One must note that “soft power is neither itself the policy nor does it define it; it merely shapes the environment in which policy is conducted.” Thus, soft power is both an environment and a supple tool for influence. The concrete political and cultural impacts of such propaganda and manipulation have yet to be studied, as this is a very recent phenomenon. However, it is a major cultural development in the region that will inevitably cause shifts in discourse, ideology, and political relationships between nations and cultural groups; for this reason, it is vital that the Turkish television industry, its output, and its impact be examined closely in the coming years.  From this understanding, the following questions arise: how are television series deliberately used by the Turkish state as tools or mediums for political influence? What are the ultimate aims of such use? 

HISTORY OF TURKISH TELEVISION

In order to address these questions, an understanding of the historical representations of political agendas in Turkish series is necessary. One salient case study is the long-running television series Kurtlar Vadisi, or Valley of the Wolves. While its production was largely geared toward a domestic Turkish audience, its impacts are far-ranging in the Turkish television industry. Valley of the Wolves first aired in 2003 and was immediately successful; it triggered a series of film versions and television re-makes including the controversial Valley of the Wolves: Iraq, Valley of the Wolves: Pusu (Ambush), and Valley of the Wolves: Palestine. While the various productions in the franchise are diverse in terms of subject matter, they all center on Turkish state intelligence agents. The franchise’s ratings on television and the box office have been exceedingly high, and it has developed a dedicated following domestically; “a couple went to court for changing the names of their children to those of characters from the show [and] several groups from the audience gathered to perform a death prayer after the death of a main character.” 

Valley of the Wolves is an innovation in both the newly privatized Turkish television market in the 2000s and the “mafia-gang subgenre that emerged after the transformation of the television market.” As such, its story and propagandistic motives become even more important. Fundamentally, Valley of the Wolves is a story of nationalistic masculinity, and it continually emphasizes that “nationalism is a patriarchal ideology, and nation-states are patriarchal systems.” The series positions itself in a lineage of Turkish nationalist heroes; it “makes references to the period from WWI, the constitution of the Turkish nation-state, and positions the protagonist’s fight in a continuum with the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923).” Turkish nationalism becomes the basis of the show. From this nationalistic adaptation, Valley of the Wolves also presents an interesting synthesis of “Turkishness” and Islamic identity that, as a result of state-enforced secularism in the 20th century, had largely been absent in television series before. In her analysis of the show, however, Berfin Emre Cetin emphasizes that “the complementary characteristics of Turkishness and Islam is not a relatively new phenomenon but rather had long been a ruling principle of the Turkish elites who decided and shaped the formation of the Turkish nation-state.” Through this coupling of Turkishness and Islam, Valley of the Wolves re-expresses Ataturk’s original Turkish nationalism. Its success has marked the series as a viable blueprint for the formulation of pro-state media in the 2010s as the Turkish political climate has shifted. This is not to say that Valley of the Wolves’ impact was only domestic; it has received much attention internationally: “the Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister had an official meeting with the Turkish Ambassador about the serial [...] Valley of the Wolves: Iraq has been discussed in the US Congress as an indicator of anti-Americanism in the Middle East.” 

NEO-OTTOMANISM AND TURKISH TELEVISION

As popularity of Turkish dramas has increased and awareness of this popularity has increased, Turkish series have become a medium to spread the Turkish state’s political and ideological agenda to the international audience. Turkey is acutely aware of its access to soft power through its exported media. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has ordained himself as “the ‘Sultan of Soft Power’ in the wider Sunni Muslim world, positioning himself as a champion for Palestine in places transcending Turkey and the Sunni Arab world.” Turkey does not truly have access to such hegemonic power. AKP, the current ruling party of Turkey that has been in place for the last two decades with an increased authoritarian hold on the state, has explicitly stated and acted upon its desire to “create a distinct and ‘dynamic cultural axis’ as part of its outward and independent foreign policy orientation.” As they have gradually consolidated domestic hegemony, the AKP’s international aims are twofold: a material projection of power through hegemony and an ideological projection through the spread of “Turkish norms and values.” Television series are tools for both of these aims. These norms and values are articulated through the aforementioned re-constructed “Turkish-Islamic” identity. 

Mirroring the right-wing nationalist tendencies and neo-Ottomanism in political discourse in Turkey, both the material and ideological projections are rooted in neo-Ottomanism -- the idea of reviving imperialist influence and cultural, political, and economic hegemony over former Ottoman lands. The administration views much of the Balkans and specifically countries like Kosovo as “neo-Ottoman vassal state[s], with TV series aiding in strengthening a positive image of Turkey whilst instilling further admiration.” The Ottoman Empire is also one of the most popular settings for Turkish dramas. Particularly iconic is the 2011 series Magnificent Century exploring a highly dramatized life in the palace during Sultan Suleyman’s reign; it was “one of the most popular programs in Turkey […] the [pre]eminent show in the Middle East, broadcasted in 45 nations, with the programs subtly altering cultural norms.” This historically inaccurate, stylized, and dramatized portrayal of palace life acts as propaganda for and a whitewashing of the Ottomans as a modern, sophisticated, and highly sexualized society; this serves as propaganda for the Turkish state by extension, as the current ruling party views itself as a neo-Ottoman entity. Of course, Ottoman period series also have a domestic audience; shows like Dirilis: Ertugrul, with highly successful ratings, “convey the notion that Turkey has a distinctive mission as the heir of a great empire […]  these series calms viewers by capitalizing on a satisfying myth of Turkish glory.” In essence, the Turk begins seeing himself as the Ottoman and Turkish hero with a glorious cultural lineage and a destiny to rule over the former Ottoman lands. 

CASE IN POINT: PAYITAHT

Payitaht: Abdulhamid, or The Last Emperor in English, serves as a useful case study to analyze the recent neo-Ottoman propaganda in television series. Premiering in 2017, it centers on the 34th and last Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II. In introducing the series, producer Yusuf Esenkal said, "The series will show the 'Greek War' which the Ottomans won after many years of loss. The series will also feature the First Zionist Congress, the construction of the Hejaz Railway and the debate over the lands of Palestine which the Ottoman sultan did not give away to the Western powers. The only message we want to deliver with 'Payitaht Abdülhamid' is to 'fight until the end.’” This is an essential neo-Ottoman discursive construction: an anti-Western stance appropriating anti-imperialist language while advocating for the Ottoman empire’s right to rule the Middle East and its surrounding territories. It is not empire, exploitation, and lack of sovereignty that is the issue. Rather, the Muslim Turks have an inherent right to conquer land and rule them because of their religious and historical authority. The Palestinian land is not thought to belong to the people living on it, but to the Ottoman Empire; they do not oppose Zionism in support of Palestine’s indigenous population, but because it encroaches on the Ottomans’ controlled lands. Indeed, the show serves as a repudiation and rewriting of the history of the later Ottoman empire, Abdülhamid's many mistakes, and the late Ottomans’ many atrocities; it also serves as a clear allegory for modern-day Turkey. Various conspiratorial powers serve as “enemies” of the Turkish and/or Muslim people in AKP discourse. It leaves viewers “with a revisionist, conspiratorial narrative of Turkish history” and “the series’ villains actually strongly resemble those imagined by President Erdoğan, with the entwining of conspiracies being germane to the grand conspiracy referred to by, again, Erdoğan, and watched over by an obscure puppet-master he calls ‘the Mastermind,’ the title of a documentary aired on a prominent pro-government news channel that, inter alia, exposed how Jews controlled the world for the previous 3,500 years.” The enemy of the state/people (the two merge into a single entity) shifts according to conspiracy and in a manner that is historically inaccurate. This often serves to further demonize historically marginalized communities in the region such as Middle Eastern Jewish communities. The neo-Ottoman Turkish nationalists always position the Turks as a paradoxical perennial glorious hero and pitiable victim. 

An analysis of the first episode of Payitaht Abdülhamid serves as an excellent example of this form of neo-Ottoman propaganda. The episode begins with the Sultan Abdülhamid marching through the streets of Istanbul in what seems to be an official ceremony. Men and women wave modern Turkish flags, and the soldiers surrounding him play traditional imperial anthem music. This music and imagery is particularly evocative for a Turkish audience, as it is very closely associated with national military pride and particularly the Turkish War of Independence, which takes place not long after the events of the television show. Payitaht immediately awakens a nationalist spirit and a sense of pride in a Turkish audience, and then deftly orients this emotional response in a negative direction: during the procession, a coin engraved with the Star of David is passed from a member of the crowd to one of the soldiers, signaling the beginning of an insurrection. The soldiers yell and shoot at the Sultan’s car, and the screen immediately cuts to the logo of the show -- Payitaht Abdülhamid written under the Ottoman coat of arms. 

In its first few minutes, Payitaht establishes a conflict between the righteous empire and its evil dissidents that sets the tone of the show. The show blatantly takes advantage of this dichotomy: the “righteous” characters, including the Sultan, are depicted in bright lighting and warm-toned physical settings; the music in scenes centering on the Sultan becomes traditional. Imperial anthems or the mehter military music are again particularly notable because of their nationalist, militaristic connotation in Turkish culture. Abdülhamid is lauded by the viziers: he is “the ruler of the believers, the patron of the people who believe in God, the servant of Mecca and Medina, the caliph of God on Earth, the mighty Abdülhamid the second… may God strengthen your caliphate, and may God make your country everlasting!” While it could be argued that this is simply a representation of ceremonies centered on poetic praise of a ruler, it cannot be denied that this also is a manifestation of the series’ characterization of Abdülhamid. Also of note is the religious undertones of the lauding: Abdülhamid is clearly ordained as the hero of the show, but this praise also introduces the righteousness of his character -- a righteousness predicated upon religious character and qualities. This is reinforced in the representation of the opposite end of the dichotomy. Dissident palace residents, or those who simply question the Sultan’s authority, are depicted in darker settings with ominous music. The members of the palace who disagree with the Sultan and royalty are also explicitly advocating for Western influence and are depicted as disinterested in tradition, Turkish identity, and Islam. The young princes of the Yildiz Palace joke that they have “forgotten Nas and Felak,” short verses of the Qur’an that are basic knowledge for most Muslims, even those without any sort of formal religious education. It is implied that they are far removed from their traditions and religion, emboldening their interest in (Western) modernity. Virtue or lack thereof, then, is signaled by attitude toward religion and tradition and the consequential attitude toward Western influence. Beyond a signal of virtue, interest in modernity also becomes an indication of depravity and evil. A pasha who disagrees with the Sultan’s rule, for example, praises the United States and its exploitation of Black slave labor for building railroads. Most audiences will interpret this as a highly offensive stance; thus the connections between evil, lack of interest in religion and tradition, advocacy for modernity, and opposition to Ottoman royalty are strengthened as a mass in diametric opposition to the “good” and “righteous” Ottoman ruler. 

Payitaht transforms “Turkish” virtue into explicitly “Islamic” virtue. The show taps into the rise of Anti-Semitism (distinct from Anti-Zionism) among Muslims of the Middle East, who view the issue of Palestine as a religious struggle instead of an anti-colonial struggle. With specific references to Muslims as a mass group, the Caliphate, and Islamic virtues, the show succeeds in providing an attractive portrait of the Ottoman empire to its international Muslim viewers. The Ottoman Empire, and by proxy the contemporary neo-Ottoman Turkish state, became the vanguard of the Muslim world. Thus, the Turkish state establishes a natural route to hegemony over the region’s Muslim population. Payitaht Abdülhamid is a comprehensive articulation of the many facets of Turkish dramas as tools of soft power: neo-Ottomanism, the rise of a Turko-Islamic identity, the rise of Turkish cultural products as soft power, and the AKP’s explicit aims of establishing hegemony over a “Muslim” world or the Middle East are evident.

bibliography

Berfin Emre Çetin, The Paramilitary Hero on Turkish Television: A Case Study on Valley of the Wolves (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015).

Constantinos Constantinou and Zenonas Tziarras, 2018, “TV Series in Turkish Foreign Policy: Aspects of Hegemony and Resistance,” New Middle Eastern Studies 8, no. 1 (doi:10.29311/nmes.v8i1.2875).

Nehir Ağırseven and Armağan Orki, “Evaluating Turkish TV Series as Soft Power Instruments,” OPUS 7, no. 13 (Dec. 2017), doi:10.26466/opus.353287.

Payitaht Abdülhamid, Episode 1, “Payitaht Abdülhamid 1.Bölüm,” TRT Televizyon (5 July 2018), YouTube, www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyNz3YvSEhk.

“Sultan Abdulhamid's Era Depicted in New TV Series.” DailySabah, Daily Sabah, 10 Jan. 2017, www.dailysabah.com/arts-culture/2017/01/11/sultan-abdulhamids-era-depicted-in-new-t-series, 1.