STudying The Tunisian National Trade Union

Ava Erfani

National trade unions rose in popularity and necessity after the Industrial Revolution; their multinational presence is dependent on the industrial development of the countries into which it proliferates. As laborers faced deteriorating conditions and low wages with industrialization, unions to stave off the most glaring parts of industrial working conditions. While national trade unions are widespread internationally, their efficacy and impact remains a point of contention.[1]

The friction between fruitfulness and superfluous authority is particularly relevant with respect to the Arab Spring uprisings which can be linked to broader public rejection of neoliberal economics.[2]  My interest in this issue led me to study the Tunisian national trade union, the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT). As evidenced by the widespread protests leading to the Tunisian revolution in 2011, the Tunisian worker was not sufficiently aided by the efforts of the UGTT. However, the union (along with three other major civil society organizations) was entrusted with the task of establishing order in 2014 during a political crisis that threatened the democratic reforms won by the Tunisian revolution.[3] In the context of Tunisian labor relations and government power,[4] I see the UGTT as bearing the faith of both the citizens and the state. These two forces are in opposition, but the UGTT is a representative of each, seeking to find a confluence in the contradiction. 

Background

Tunisia’s history with trade unionism can be traced back to the origins of the independence movement (from 1881 to 1956, Tunisia was under French occupation).[5] Before the creation of the UGTT, there first existed the Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (CGTT), a trade union, founded in 1924 by Mohammad Ali al Hammi, that aligned itself with the Tunisian nationalist and anti-colonial Destour party. This was the first break from the French trade union, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), to gain real autonomy on behalf of the Tunisian worker. The CGTT was quelled by the colonial authorities. Years later in 1946, the UGTT was formally established by Farhat Hached.[6] From the start, its goal was to advocate for both workers’ rights and Tunisia’s independence from France. This duality is important: as we trace the organization to the postmodern era in which colonial influence is no longer obvious or direct, the union’s outward goals remain to subvert multiple forms of control (governmental, international, etc.).

As was the case for other historically colonized countries in the Maghreb, a formal end to direct colonial power did not lead to an increase in the power of the citizen of the postcolonial state.[7] In the absence of the French authority’s disciplinary control, power was simply transferred to new authoritarian (yet now described as “nationalist”) actors. The Neo-Destour party (successor to the Destour party of the pre-1930s era) led the anti-colonial and nationalist effort to remove the French authority from Tunisia. After independence, this party assumed power. However, there was a large conflict within Neo-Destour, primarily between its top leaders: Habib Bourguiba and Salah Ben Youssef.[8] The former chose to work with the leading French authorities in the process of independence (initially due to his willingness to accept the softer “autonomy” rather than independence) while Youssef took a more radical approach. Eventually, Bourguiba’s influence won and he went on to become the first and longest President of Tunisia. Bourguiba’s win can be interpreted as the single most decisive arc in the future tone for UGTT operations in the Tunisian independent state.[9]

To fully comprehend the shifts that occurred in the UGTT post-2011 revolution, it is helpful to understand how the union changed after independence from France was achieved and how it operated in the authoritarian regimes of both Habib Bourguiba and Zine el Abidine Ben Ali. Much of the existing literature on the UGTT — particularly works written in or translated into English — focuses on the union’s role in Tunisia’s revolution and the broader context of Arab Spring uprisings.[10],[11], [12] For the scope of this study, however, it has been helpful to outline the nature of the UGTT pre-revolution and the ways in which its influence was both strengthened and limited by the authoritarian regimes under which it operated. 

Issue 56 of the Anarcho-Syndicalist Review discusses the ways in which the UGTT was suppressed by both Bourguiba and Ben Ali in the article “Tunisia’s UGTT: Caught between struggle & betrayal.” The Bourguiba years held their fair share of conflict between the UGTT and the state, but in the ‘60s and ’70s the former was allowed significant autonomy. This autonomy subsequently led to clashes in which state violence was effected against the workers.[13]A report in the 67th issue of the Middle East Research and Information Project journal on a UGTT strike in late January of 1978 describes this conflict: “A general strike called by the half-strong Union générale des travailleurs tunisiens (UGTT) was met with violence by the regime. Army, police and paramilitary units joined in a general offensive against the workers, leaving more than two hundred dead and hundreds more injured and arrested.”[14]While this report contextualizes the importance and danger of protesting with the UGTT, it reveals looming disparities between the former and current images of the institution. Where a general strike would garner the response of state violence in 1978, today the same rejection of work is part of the sanctioned list of responses allowed by the government apparatus in response to any discontent with economic conditions.

This sort of conflict was not allowed to continue, however, in the Ben Ali era: 

“In 1989, Ben Ali’s regime imposed direct submission on the UGTT leadership, headed by Ismail Sahbani, who collaborated in the implementation of neoliberal economic policies and fiercely fought the union left...The history of the leadership of the UGTT is a story of betrayal and maneuvering. From its support for Ben Ali's candidacy in the elections of 2004 and 2009 to social welfare reform, from the implementation of neoliberal economic measures to their abandoning of the Gafsa UGTT activists, jailed during the 2008 uprising, when they limited themselves to a simple request for the release of the prisoners.” 

This is where the ethos of the union is least convincing as it threw its weight behind the top-down neoliberalism of Ben Ali rather than attempt to continue grassroots or local efforts to achieve growth or improve conditions for workers.

The union is not monolithic. It is comprised of 24 regional unions, 19 sector federations, and 21 general unions with a total of around 750,000 members from all geographic areas of Tunisia.[15] This regional component of diversity is a widely celebrated attribute of the union and one that is rare for many civil society organizations; this is why it is able to reach high levels of trust among the citizens. Even so, in the post-democracy era there remains the question of how much the UGTT can truly accomplish on behalf of the worker, especially when the country faces difficult economic conditions.[16] It is often credited for “stabilization” post-revolution and the prevention of total state control by the Islamic party à la the 1979 Iranian revolution. In this way, it is viewed as a worthy representative of the Tunisian people based on its ability to uphold and protect the democracy that they were protesting for in 2011. However, the same economic symptoms which persisted before the 2011 revolution continue to exist today, so it remains to be seen whether authoritarianism is truly what was holding the UGTT back from effecting change for the workers of Tunisia. 

Methodology

Overview

This research is based primarily on interviews in addition to scholarly sources, some of whichoutline the history of Tunisia and the trade union movement and others that discuss the politics in post-revolution Tunisia. I conducted a series of four in-depth interviews with Tunisians living in Northern Tunisia during the fall of 2019. These interviews were conducted with two members of the UGTT as well as two non-members. Interviews conducted with members were completed in French/Arabic with the aid of a translator, while the interviews with non-members of the union were conducted in English. I was able to interview the members of the UGTT thanks to the connections of my professor, Mounir Khelifa, and my advisor, Rached Khalifa. My advisor also connected me with one of the non-member interviewees, a female master’s student who was enrolled in his graduate seminar.  The questioning for the interviews done with members of the UGTT differed from the questions asked of non-members. The latter form of interview was largely to determine a sense of public perception, while the interviews with UGTT members sought to acquire institutional or official knowledge about the inner structure/working of the organization. 

I was able to contextualize my findings based on a series of lectures attended in September and October 2019 via SIT’s academic program and the course Politics, Civil Society, and Migration in Tunisia. This course provided me with a broad historical background regarding the politics of Tunisia, specifically the forces that pushed the revolution in 2011 and facilitated the formation of government and order following the revolution. A program visit to the Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Économique et Sociaux (FTDES), a Tunisian NGO formed after the revolution to organize social and political movements, also aided me in understanding how the civil society sector is related to the UGTT. I utilized this visit in particular to inquire about the manner in which jobs are created and provided in Tunisia by the government with some UGTT influence. The representative of the FTDES with whom we met was extremely helpful in providing this information examining the more tangible policies and actions of the UGTT. From this conversation, it seemed that FTDES faced a similar dilemma as the UGTT—though its history is much shorter— insofar as it created both an avenue for people to organize and a simultaneous entrenchment of the status quo which allowed and possibly encouraged this sort of sanctioned form of protest.

Concerns

This study must not be taken as representative of the Tunisian public or be generalized to make assumptions beyond its scope. Rather, this study can be used to further general discussion on the efficacy of the UGTT and how it operates in the sociopolitical space of Tunisia’s democracy. There were multiple ethical concerns in conducting this research. Firstly, there was only a short timeframe to complete the interviews as well as a language barrier that made it difficult to recruit interviewees and/or set up times for interviews that would be convenient. Thus, I was reliant on existing contacts in the Tunis area to find possible interviewees, introducing bias in my sample in terms of region and, likely, social status. Further biases exist due to the fact that no Tunisians living in southern Tunisia were represented in this research, though some interviewees are originally from the south.

Research Findings

I will present the interviews I conducted in two major parts: first, I will present the perspectives of those who were involved in the UGTT directly in order to give a deeper understanding of how the union operates. My primary goals during these interviews were (1) to understand the logistical aspects of membership and the structure of the union, and (2) to inquire about the political reach and aims of the UGTT from the perspective of a current or former member. Secondly, I will present the findings of my second set of interviews with those who are not directly involved in the union so in order to present a more general discussion of the influence and power of the UGTT even to those who are not directly impacted by it via membership. Ultimately, my aim during these interviews was to openly question the interviewees about their experience or thoughts regarding the UGTT from the perspective of a worker and/or citizen.

Members

Involvement

The first two interviews were with Youssef Khelifa, a lecturer at the Higher Institute of Design of Tunis, and Tahar Labassi, a linguistics professor at the University of Tunis and also the former Chief of Staff of the Minister of the Department of Education in Tunisia. Khelifa had made a request to become a member of the UGTT in 2005; in order to join, he had to win favor in elections at the Higher Institute of Design. He was elected as a basic member in 2006. Khelifa was involved in the principal syndicalist sector of higher education and continues to work in this capacity as of the publication date of this paper. He describes his work with the union as generally low-maintenance with the exception of elections and periods of charged political climates, the zenith of these being the political climate during the 2011 revolution. Labassi had no official role in the UGTT at the time of the interview but had been involved at the highest levels of the organization since 2002. He became Vice Secretary General of the trade union of teachers and a member of the national council of trade union university teachers during his time of involvement before stepping down in 2014. He continued to work with the UGTT following 2014 as a consultant. 

Perception

Khelifa began by qualifying his view of his membership: it was beneficial “psychologically” but not “financially” (though he said that he enjoys it because of this reason).[17] He highlighted the importance and power of the union: when we talk about what strikes or movements can take place, the UGTT is important because it can decide the influence, especially as it works with influential people in the government. Under the old regimes, the organization was not “too free to advocate for workers, but now, it is more free”[18] to conduct its work. Before the revolution under Ben Ali and Bourguiba, there were acts of violence and armed, bloody conflicts between the UGTT and the state. Now that democracy has been achieved, there is no longer this sort of conflict. Khelifa lamented the fact that though the UGTT has more power, the workers of Tunisia are suffering more than they were before the revolution due to a host of economic reasons.

He discussed the ways in which there was “certainly a change [in the UGTT] especially with the new emergence of Islamist parties” post-revolution.[19] Here he pointed to what he called the real function and strength of the UGTT: to defend and secure modernity for the country (he saw the new political Islamists parties as trying to “take Tunisia backwards”).[20] To Khelifa, the UGTT aims to protect and make a consensus between the Islamist parties and Modernist parties. This is why, he said, the UGTT worked against the Islamists after the revolution in order to stabilize the country. The UGTT supported many of the uprising movements at the time (populists, strikers), and so the government had to take it seriously due to the weight of the organization. They work with both the workers and the government, but from Khelifa’s point of view, the first objective is always to protect workers' rights.

Labassi had a somewhat more critical perception of the UGTT, which he attributed to his former degree of involvement in, and now relative freedom from, the organization.[21] He described the union as the only space where real politics was possible under the Ben Ali regime, though the institution was always committed to upholding the state. He admitted that today there is a question of whether or not the organization is actually a hindrance. He also described the nature of the UGTT’s negotiations with the government, which usually operate through ministers of various governmental departments. These ministers would often sign an agreement with the UGTT that would purportedly meet the demands of workers; however, due to the high turnover rate of ministers, the union leadership knows that ultimately, the onus will fall on the successive minister and will likely not be upheld. He did not place all the blame on this pattern, however, noting that the government is under great economic pressure due to a lack of means. However, the UGTT faces pressure itself from the working class as the economic situation is worsening while the cost of living rises. 

Labassi’s main qualm with the UGTT was in its failure— or as he called it, refusal— to change post-revolution. To him, changing means working as a trade union should work in a traditional democracy. He believed that the UGTT does not want to change because it is in a rather favorable position: it has an effective monopoly on unionism in the country.[22] The government cannot give other trade unions many rights; the UGTT has intentionally created this hegemony in the social sphere so that only its own organization can win any favor in the eyes of the government. Labassi pointed to the UGTT’s failure to support the initial protests for the 2011 revolution which began in the south of Tunisia.[23] The union was rather on the side of the government at the time. However, the UGTT is also not officially part of the government.[24] It plays a quasi-governmental role, and this is likely where it prefers to stay according to Labassi. He, however, believed that the union should embrace a role in national politics and move towards the path of official institutionalization on the federal level.

Non-Members

Involvement

I interviewed Lassaad Bouattour, a civil servant working for the Ministry of Finance in Tunisia, and Rawe Khefi, a master’s student at the Université de Tunis el Manar within the Higher Institute of Human Sciences. Khefi had a background in unionism in her undergraduate years, though not through the UGTT. Neither had any direct relationship with the UGTT, meaning that they were not nor had ever been part of the union and did not know anyone beyond the level of acquaintanceship who was involved with the union.

Perception

Bouattour outlined his major thoughts via a short history of the UGTT’s activity since Tunisia’s colonial period. He acknowledged it had a strong effect in the turn of independence. The syndicalist movement was threatening to the colonial powers— this, according to Bouattour, is why Farhat Hached[25] was assassinated, an act which immortalized the UGTT as a symbol/martyr for the national spirit.[26] After independence, he noted, the Neo-Destour party and the UGTT viewed themselves as co-managers of the country— this led to some clashes, but this sharing of power was largely peaceful. Ben Ali was more authoritarian; Bouattour also emphasized that he was dealing with not only the UGTT, but the Islamic Tendency movement (MTI)[27] as entities that were politically resistant to the state. Ben Ali would pick sides between UGTT and Islamists where it was convenient. Bouattour mentioned that around 1991, however, Ben Ali became more hostile towards the UGTT, insisting that the union would need to operate on his terms and even going so far as to choose its top directors. 

Bouattour became most critical of the union when discussing the education sector. As a father himself, he remarked that the UGTT’s education sector union is “an enemy of any mother/father in Tunisia,”[28] especially after mass strikes by education workers last year. He also said that today, the main way to get power is through the UGTT, while under Ben Ali similar benefits such as wage increases or job opportunities would come from membership in the party. Ultimately, he lauded the UGTT for its role in stabilizing the government post-revolution but believed that they should not take their activities too far in the political, as well as social, realm in order for the country to be able to grow economically.

Khefi held a significantly different view of the UGTT as compared to Bouattour, and even Labassi/Khelifa). As someone who has been involved in leftist political movements for years in Tunisia, she hesitated to refer to the UGTT with total positivity. She did echo some of the major sentiments: that the union was forced to conform to the state’s demands under Bourguiba and Ben Ali— though she mentioned that they were able to gain some power during the Bread Riots in which they faced violence due to the protests that they were involved in— and that generally the union has stood up for the people against the government, and they do not forget that. 

However, she criticized the union for its failure to support the miners’ protests in Gafsa in 2008 and the initial seeds of revolutionary protests as well. She praised its ability to prevent the Islamist parties from gaining too much power after the revolution and said that it was clearly committed to upholding the “Tunisian way of life”.[29] Fundamentally, Khefi saw the UGTT as remaining more pro-government than pro-citizen following the revolution and criticized its passivity regarding politics particularly after the Quartet period of 2014. For these reasons, she did not see the UGTT as becoming popular among her generation as a form of activism or movement.

Discussion and Analysis

A certain repetition took place during the course of each interview wherein the interviewee would feel compelled to outline the history of the UGTT and Tunisia before beginning to describe their own perception of the institution and/or how they were involved. Each gave relatively the same story regarding Tunisia’s history since the colonial period, though each differed in their explanations of why certain movements proceeded while others failed (e.g. Gafsa riots in 2008 vs. the Kasbah protests of 2011). This pattern made sense— it is difficult to say what exactly the UGTT is or does without discussing its history. The past of the UGTT is precisely why it is such a valued institution in the Tunisian collective conscious today. Though all the interviewees had different political leanings, they followed some similarities in their beliefs, especially that the government must continue on a secular path and that the UGTT was helpful in this endeavor. Each was concerned by the threat of major Islamic political and social forces, the most prominent being the Ennahda political party which won the highest percentage of votes in the last parliamentary elections.[30]

The difficulty in assessing the UGTT is multifaceted. The organization has a long and diverse history which makes it difficult to tie itself to a coherent ethos over time, particularly due to the various treatment it has faced under multiple regimes and the various ways the union itself has chosen to act under these regimes. The aim is to attempt to accurately assess the union on both its own terms and on the terms that the people of Tunisia hold it to. To categorize it via a traditional left vs. right dichotomy or the basic movement of state actors as the abstraction of the citizenry would be a mistake.[31] This would ignore the entire basis of the union as well as a larger critique of power from perspectives outside of the bipolar political field.

As some interviewees mentioned, the ability of the union has depended on the environment around it. For Khelifa and Labassi, the UGTT is a strong, if not the strongest, Tunisian institution and should be strengthened in the democratic era in order to be even more effective. Labassi sees the natural route for the union as following the path to becoming a political party and taking on the responsibility and accountability that comes with governance rather than needing to negotiate due to their lower status of power as a civil society group. To Khefi, who identifies as a leftist, the UGTT does not do enough for the worker, and it is unclear at best whether the union is best-suited to take on the postmodern socioeconomic problems which the youth of Tunisia face distinctly.[32] However, to Bouattour, the UGTT is too tyrannical in its measures to advocate for workers’ wages. It is these conflicting narratives that make it necessary to remove the lens of electoral politics in order to observe the kind of organization that the UGTT appears to be—it is unclear whether the UGTT can be objectively defined.[33] My purpose was to explore the effect of power and proximity to the state in an effort to fight for workers via a union organization.

Barriers

In addition to the aforementioned difficulties, if this research was to be continued and expanded, it would be helpful to be able to speak to current members of the executive board of the UGTT. This would allow for an additional level of perception which might be interesting to contextualize the union more directly. Further, it would be useful to gather perceptions from those outside of the Tunis area, particularly in regions such as Gafsa, Sidi Bouzid, Gabes, etc. where the 2011 revolution began and where the socioeconomic conditions differ. An increase in interviews with the inclusion of more demographics as well would aid this research. Moreover, in all such interactions, the presence of a reliable translator, or the personal development of Tunisian Arabic/French fluency, would be extremely important to reduce as much of the language barrier as possible. A translator would also be advantageous in the reading of sources and texts relating to the UGTT.

Conclusion

Though my collection of interviews were limited in quantity, they provided me with a wide range of perspectives on the UGTT. These perspectives should not be used to reflect the actual and exact sentiments of the Tunisian people towards the union but can be useful in a discourse regarding the UGTT and a broader discourse surrounding the ethics and efficacy of national unions. These interviews allowed me to develop a more extensive comprehension of how the union is perceived. The UGTT is in a unique position, whether viewed as a national union, political institution, civil society group, etc. However, in the post-democratic era, the UGTT does not seem to use its advantages to change the material conditions for workers— purchasing power is low and social unrest is high. This begs the question of whether it is a matter of will: is the union purposefully avoiding a more radical approach to maintain its power status,[34]or does it believe that its current strategy is truly the most effective for its aims? These are vital questions that are highly relevant to the exploration and imagination of the realm of possibilities that the UGTT can either create for Tunisia or suppress.

Bibliography

al-Hanachi, Abdul L. “Tunisia’s First Legislative Elections Post-Revolution.” Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera Media Network, October 2, 2014. http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/10/20141027409786296.html.

Bogaert, Koenraad. “Contextualizing the Arab Revolts: The Politics behind Three Decades of Neoliberalism in the Arab World.” Middle East Critique 22, no. 3 (February 2013): 213–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2013.814945.

Brown, L. Carl. “Bourguiba and Bourguibism Revisited: Reflections and Interpretation.” Middle East Journal 55, no. 1 (2001): 43-57. www.jstor.org/stable/4329581.

Chayes, Sarah. “How a Leftist Labor Union Helped Force Tunisia’s Political Settlement.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 27, 2014. https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/27/how-leftist-labor-union-helped-force-tunisia-s-political-settlement-pub-55143.

Chiraz, Rouissi, and Mohamed Frioui. “The Impact of Inflation After the Revolution in Tunisia.” Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 109 (January 8, 2014): 246–49. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.12.453.

Coker, Margaret. “Nobel Peace Prize Awarded to Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet.” Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones & Company, October 9, 2015. https://www.wsj.com/articles/nobel-peace-prize-awarded-to-tunisian-national-dialogue-quartet-1444382662.

Disney, Nigel. “The Working Class Revolt in Tunisia.” MERIP Reports, no. 67 (May 1978): 12–14. https://doi.org/10.2307/3011401.

Foucault, Michel. “The Subject and Power.” Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982): 777–95. https://doi.org/10.1086/448181.

Karray, Bassem. “Proposals, Intermediation, and Pressure: The Three Roles of the UGTT in Tunisia’s Post-Revolutionary Constitutional Process.” Socioeconomic Protests in MENA and Latin America, June 2019, 123–44. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19621-9_5.

Lassaad Bouattour in oral interview with author. November 19, 2019.

Michels, Robert. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2000. Accessed December 8, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, 224-234.

Omri, Mohamed-Salah. “No Ordinary Union: UGTT and the Tunisian Path to Revolution and Transition.” Workers of the World 1, no. 7 (November 2015): 14–29.

Rawe Khefi in oral interview with author. November 30, 2019.

“Tunisia Urged to Reopen Hached Case.” News | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera Media Network, December 27, 2009. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2009/12/20091227135724498458.html.

“Tunisia’s UGTT: Caught between Struggle and Betrayal.” Anarcho-Syndicalist Review, no. 56 (2011): 22–23.

Youssef Khelifa in oral interview with author. October 4, 2019.

Tahar Labassi in oral interview with author. October 12, 2019.

Visser, Jelle. “Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries: MLR MLR.” Monthly Labor Review 129, no. 1 (01, 2006): 38-49.

Yousfi, Hèla. Trade Unions and Arab Revolutions: the Tunisian Case of UGTT. New York; London: Routledge, 2018. 

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[1]Visser, Jelle, "Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries: MLR MLR." Monthly Labor Review129, no. 1 (01, 2006): 38-49.

[2]Bogaert, Koenraad, “Contextualizing the Arab Revolts: The Politics behind Three Decades of Neoliberalism in the Arab World.” Middle East Critique22, no. 3 (February 2013): 213–34.

[3]Margaret Coker, “Nobel Peace Prize Awarded to Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet.” Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, October 9, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/nobel-peace-prize-awarded-to-tunisian-national-dialogue-quartet-1444382662.

[4]For a broader discussion of what is meant here by the term “power” and how it is exercised, see: Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power.” Critical Inquiry8, no. 4 (1982): 777–95, https://doi.org/10.1086/448181.

[5]The effects of this colonialism can be expanded upon in multiple volumes, but for the purposes of this research, I am interested in the impacts of French colonialism on the political structure of Tunisia post-independence as well as how this structure impacted the creation and development of the UGTT.

[6]Hèla Yousfi, Trade Unions and Arab Revolutions: the Tunisian Case of UGTT. (New York ; London: Routledge, 2018), 4.

[7]Michael J.Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco From Independence to the Arab Spring, (Oxford University Press, 2014

[8]Ibid., 38.

[9]For a broader discussion on Bourguiba and his actions as a political figure, see: Brown, L. Carl, "Bourguiba and Bourguibism Revisited: Reflections and Interpretation." Middle East Journal55, no. 1 (2001): 43-57. www.jstor.org/stable/4329581.

[10]Lorenzo Feltrin, “Labour and Democracy in the Maghreb: The Moroccan and Tunisian Trade Unions in the 2011 Arab Uprisings.” Economic and Industrial Democracy40, no. 1 (February 2019): 42–64. doi:10.1177/0143831X18780316.

[11]Bassem Karray, “Proposals, Intermediation, and Pressure: The Three Roles of the UGTT in Tunisia’s Post-Revolutionary Constitutional Process.” Socioeconomic Protests in MENA and Latin America, June 2019, 123–44.

[12]Mohamed-Salah Omri, “No Ordinary Union: UGTT and the Tunisian Path to Revolution and Transition.” Workers of the World1, no. 7 (November 2015): 14–29.

[13]“Tunisia's UGTT: Caught between Struggle and Betrayal.” Anarcho-Syndicalist Review, no. 56 (2011): 22–23.

[14]Nigel Disney, “The Working Class Revolt in Tunisia.” MERIP Reports, no. 67 (May 1978): 12–14. 

[15]Hèla Yousfi, Trade Unions and Arab Revolutions: the Tunisian Case of UGTT, 1.

[16]For an outline of these conditions in the era following the revolution, see: Rouissi Chiraz and Mohamed Frioui, “The Impact of Inflation After the Revolution in Tunisia,” Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences109 (January 8, 2014): pp. 246-249, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.12.453)

[17]Youssef Khelifa in oral interview with author, 4 October, 2019.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Tahar Labassi in oral interview with the author, 12 October, 2019.

[22]As opposed to Morocco’s union format which follows the model of competitive unionism. See: Lorenzo Feltrin, “Labour and Democracy in the Maghreb: The Moroccan and Tunisian Trade Unions in the 2011 Arab Uprisings”, 45.

[23]This was not the first time this siding has occurred: in February of 1984, during the “Bread Riots” caused by IMF-imposed measures to decrease agricultural subsidies, the postal service and education unions striked without UGTT approval, causing their organizers to be excommunicated from the union. Yousfi, 17.

[24]As opposed to an established political party such as the Labour Party in the UK

[25]Former leader of the UGTT during the independence movement

[26]Though there has been no conclusive investigation, it is largely believed that the armed French organization La Main Rouge was responsible for the attack on Hached, whose death is commemorated every year in Tunisia. “Tunisia Urged to Reopen Hached Case.” News | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera Media Network, December 27, 2009. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2009/12/20091227135724498458.html.

[27]See: Rory McCarthy,  Inside Tunisia’s Al-Nahda(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

[28]Lassaad Bouattour in oral interview with author, 19 November, 2019.

[29]Rawe Khefi in oral interview with author, 30 November, 2019.

[30]Abdul L. al-Hanachi, “Tunisia's First Legislative Elections Post-Revolution.” Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera Media Network, October 2, 2014. http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/10/20141027409786296.html.

[31]Sarah Chayes, “How a Leftist Labor Union Helped Force Tunisia's Political Settlement.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 27, 2014. https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/27/how-leftist-labor-union-helped-force-tunisia-s-political-settlement-pub-55143.

[32]This points to the rising precarity in the Tunisian economy as a result of various governmental decisions and the impact of IMF loan conditionality. See: Rouissi Chiraz and Mohamed Frioui, “The Impact of Inflation After the Revolution in Tunisia,” Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences109 (January 8, 2014): pp. 246-249, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.12.453)

[33]Yousfi’sTrade Unions and Arab Revolutions: the Tunisian Case of UGTT would likely go the farthest in this endeavor, at least in English-language sources.